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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 11-2681 
___________ 
 
JIAN ZUAU ZHENG, 
    Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 
                                Respondent 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A070-838-800) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable William Strasser 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 8, 2012 
 
Before: RENDELL, VANASKIE and GARTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: March 12, 2012) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 As the parties are familiar with the background of the case, which we have set 
forth previously in Zheng v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 549 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 
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2008) (“Zheng I”), and Zheng v. Attorney Gen. of the United States, 396 F. App‟x 812 
(3d Cir. 2010) (“Zheng II”), we will only briefly summarize the background here 
(although we will refer to other facts as they become relevant to our analysis).   
Essentially, Jian Zhau Zheng, whose exclusion order became final in 1997, sought 
to reopen his immigration proceedings in the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”).  In 
2006, he filed his second motion to reopen,
1
 which the BIA denied.  Zheng then filed a 
petition for review.  We granted the petition and vacated the BIA‟s order on the basis of a 
procedural deficiency in the BIA‟s analysis.  In short, and without implying that the BIA 
came to the wrong result, we held that the matter had to be remanded because the BIA 
needed to fully consider the evidence Zheng presented.  Zheng I, 549 F.3d at 272.   
On remand after Zheng I, Zheng submitted additional evidence (14 additional 
documents) to the BIA.  The BIA again denied the motion to reopen.  Zheng filed another 
petition for review, which we also granted.  Reviewing the matter, we described the 
BIA‟s ruling and stated that it was unclear whether the BIA followed the “directive that it 
„must actually consider the evidence and argument that a party presents.‟”  Zheng II, 396 
F. App‟x at 814.  We further explained: 
                                              
1
Generally, an alien may file with the BIA one motion to reopen his proceeding 
and that motion must be filed within 90 days of the date of the final administrative 
decision.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2).  Zheng sought to avoid the time- and number-bars by 
showing that his motion to reopen was “based on changed circumstances arising in the 
country of nationality . . . if such evidence is material and was not available . . . at the 
previous hearing[.]”  Id. at § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). 
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The BIA‟s approach is deficient because it completely fails to examine the 
submitted evidence and to determine whether it supports Zheng‟s claim that 
conditions in China have changed. We remanded this case because the BIA 
did not “discuss most of the evidentiary record[.]” 549 F.3d at 269. The 
BIA‟s decision following remand still lacks any reasoned discussion of 
either the initial submissions from Zheng or the additional fourteen 
documents submitted on remand. Without a substantive analysis by the BIA 
of the evidence adduced by Zheng, we are unable to discern its reasons for 
denying the motion to reopen.  
 
Id. at 815.  Stating also that the BIA had not conducted a qualitative assessment of the 
evidence submitted, as it must to analyze material evidence of changed country 
conditions, we vacated the BIA‟s decision.  Id.  We remanded the matter so that the “BIA 
may address Zheng‟s evidence and explain whether that evidence supports his claim of 
changed country conditions and thereby warrants reopening his exclusion proceeding.”  
Id.        
 On remand before the BIA, Zheng again submitted additional documents (totaling 
192 pages).  He provided documents about two individuals who purportedly were 
sterilized in China after having two children in the United States; more information about 
Chinese household registration requirements for children born in the United States; and 
additional State Department and Congressional reports on China.  The materials also 
included a “review and evaluation” of the State Department Report and a packet of cases 
about forced abortions, infanticide, and other examples of coercive family planning 
originally collected by an anonymous Chinese national and prepared by the China Aid 
Association and Women‟s Rights without Frontiers for a Congressional hearing.   
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 The BIA again denied Zheng‟s motion, this time issuing a seven-page, single-
spaced decision to support its ruling that Zheng‟s evidence was insufficient to establish a 
material change in the enforcement of the population control policy.  The BIA also 
declined to exercise its authority to reopen the proceedings sua sponte, holding that 
Zheng had not shown an exceptional situation warranting reopening.   
 Zheng presents another petition for review.  We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(a).  We review the BIA‟s order denying the motion to reopen for abuse of 
discretion.  Zheng I, 549 F.3d at 264-65.    
On review, we conclude that on this remand, the BIA thoroughly considered the 
evidence, as we expected, and corrected the procedural deficiency in its analysis that we 
identified in the earlier decisions in this case.  We hold that the BIA‟s conclusion, based 
on a full analysis of the evidence, was not an abuse of discretion.
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 As Zheng argues, the BIA did not discuss every piece of evidence in detail.  For 
instance, the BIA declined to address evidence it had already addressed in earlier 
precedential decisions (including documents submitted after the first remand, namely the 
                                              
2
 Zheng does not seem to challenge the BIA‟s decision not to reopen the 
proceedings sua sponte.  The BIA‟s decision to decline to exercise its discretion to reopen 
a case sua sponte is generally unreviewable, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); Calle-
Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir. 2003), although the Court can review the 
BIA‟s ruling on whether a petitioner has shown an “exceptional situation” or, stated 
otherwise, whether a petitioner has established a prima facie case for sua sponte relief.  
See Cruz v. Att‟y Gen., 452 F.3d 240, 250 (3d Cir. 2006).  Even if Zheng were to present 
this type of argument, however, it would be without merit.  There is no evidence that the 
BIA is ignoring a general policy it had established as there was in Cruz.  See 452 F. 3d at 
246 n.3 & 249-50.   
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1999 Changle City Family Planning Office handbook and opinion, the 2003 
Administrative Decision of the Fujian Province Family Planning Committee, as well as 
the earlier submitted testimony of John Aird).  However, here the BIA incorporated by 
reference the reasoning in such cases as Matter of S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 247, 252 (BIA 
2007), and Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 185, 189-90 (BIA 2007). 
The BIA otherwise discussed the other evidence in detail.  It rejected Zheng‟s 
personal evidence as unpersuasive for establishing changed country conditions, noting 
that the portion of his affidavit concerning the enforcement of the family planning laws in 
China was not based on personal knowledge.  The BIA stated that Zheng had not 
supported his claims related to forced sterilization of his neighbors in China (or even 
asserted that the alleged incidents were related to the birth of foreign-born children).  A 
letter from the Changle City Family Planning Office also did not persuade the BIA on the 
grounds that it was a photocopy without the name or signature of an official.  The BIA 
may “properly discount” documents that are not authenticated.  See Chen v. Att‟y Gen., -
-- F.3d ---, No. 09-3459, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5358, at *14 (3d Cir. Mar. 18, 2011).  
The BIA further acknowledged that the letter indicated that Zheng would have to undergo 
the same family planning procedures as a local resident would, but noted that the letter 
did not specify the penalties for refusing sterilization or demonstrate a reasonable 
likelihood that he would be sterilized or face any other sanction that would qualify as 
persecution.   
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 The BIA considered the State Department Reports for 2005, 2007, and 2009, and 
read them to mean that the Chinese government continues its population control policy, 
with enforcement and penalties varying by region, with reports of sporadic human rights 
violations by local officials.  The BIA noted that violators may have to pay a social 
compensation fee of varying amounts, but that Zheng did not prove that any such fee 
imposed on him would be persecutory.  The BIA also concluded that the State 
Department Reports were more reliable than the review and evaluation of them that 
Zheng submitted, not only because State Department Reports are generally considered 
highly probative evidence but also because the reviewer did not provide a curriculum 
vitae, based conclusions in speculation instead of personal knowledge, and demonstrated 
an unfavorable bias against the State Department and all government  agencies.  The BIA 
separately noted that the reviewer conceded that there is no universal consensus on 
whether forced abortions occur and stated that the review did not purport to address 
individual claims.  State Department Reports may serve as substantial evidence, and the 
BIA provided a well-reasoned explanation to permissibly credit the Reports over other 
evidence.  See Yu v. Att‟y Gen., 513 F.3d 346, 349 (3d Cir. 2008).  We have approved of 
similar conclusions by the BIA based on the 2007 State Department Report in an asylum 
case brought by a Chinese national from Fujian province who was the mother of two 
children born in the United States.  See Chen, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5358, at *9-10.  In 
Chen, we discussed Matter of H-L-H-, which Zheng tries to distinguish.  However, as in 
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Chen, Matter of H-L-H- “contains a comprehensive discussion that persuasively 
addresses many of the issues before us.”  2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 5358, at *5.  In Matter 
of H-L-H-, the BIA noted that the 2007 State Department Report discussed evidence that 
there were no cases of forced sterilizations in the ten previous years.  25 I. & N. Dec. 
209, 214 (BIA 2010).          
The BIA also ruled that neither the Congressional-Executive Commission on 
China‟s 2005 Annual Report nor a March 14, 2006 letter from the “Administrative Office 
of the National Population and Family Planning Committee” (relating to the application 
of family planning laws to citizens returning from abroad) altered the BIA‟s assessment, 
in Matter of J-W-S-, 24 I & N. Dec. 185 (BIA 2007), that children born in the United 
States are regarded as U.S. citizens and not counted for population control purposes and 
that there is no national policy of forced sterilization of returning citizens with a second 
child born outside of China.  The packet of cases prepared for a Congressional hearing 
was described, accurately, as anecdotal evidence that did not convince the BIA that there 
is no country-wide campaign of forcible sterilization of returning nationals with children.   
 The BIA also declined to rely on incomplete 2007, 2009, and 2010 Congressional-
Executive Commission on China Annual Reports, particularly because it appeared that 
crucial aspects of the reports, such as the sections about the status of women, were 
missing.  The BIA emphasized that the interference with women‟s reproductive lives 
continued, and that it varied by locality.  A conclusion that conditions continued 
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undermines Zheng‟s claim of changed circumstances.  The BIA additionally noted that 
the reports, by the references to unspecified “remedial measures” or abortion as an 
“official policy instrument,”  did not address the treatment of those with foreign-born 
children or demonstrate that policy violators would face persecution  
 The affidavits and statements that Zheng submitted regarding the forced 
sterilization of parents with foreign-born children were held not to be persuasive.  The 
BIA concluded that two, from Renzum Yuan and Fengchai Chai, were not even affidavits 
because they were not sworn before someone authorized to administer oaths.  The BIA 
questioned the declarants‟ identity, their reliability, and the substance of the statements, 
noting additionally that the affidavits were copies from other cases and supported by 
unauthenticated documents.  Also, Yuan‟s appeared to have been made for purposes of 
his own litigation.  Discussing the affidavits of Jin Fu Chen and Jiang Zhen Chen, the 
BIA noted that not only were they also copies from other cases and supported by 
unauthenticated documents, but also they related to parents of children born in Japan and 
presented no specific circumstances surrounding the abortions.  Other Family Planning 
documents were similarly questioned as unauthenticated.  As noted above, the BIA may 
accord less weight to unauthenticated documents.  See Chen, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 
5358, at *14.   
 The BIA ruled that the remaining documents also did not warrant reopening.  The 
2003 Consular Information Sheet was found not to discuss the population control policy 
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or show that nationals returning to Fujian province with foreign born children would be 
persecuted.  Although the Population and Family Planning Regulation discussed fines 
and rewards to achieve compliance with the law, it did not describe sanctions amounting 
to persecution.  The testimony of Harry Wu was described as without a clear foundational 
basis.  His testimony, as well as articles in the record, was criticized as not providing 
information specific to the return of nationals to Fujian province.  The BIA discussed the 
issues of household registration, use of travel documents and the law of entries and exits 
in China, citizenship issues for foreign-born children of Chinese descent, and sanctions 
for returning Chinese nationals, and concluded that none of the evidence demonstrated 
that parents of foreign-born children faced persecution or that the Chinese government 
has changed the way it treats the parents of foreign born children.   
 In short, unlike in its earlier rulings in Zheng‟s case, the BIA considered Zheng‟s 
evidence and conducted a case-specific analysis of the evidence, as it must, see Chen, 
2011 U.S. App. 5358, at *10, in coming to its conclusion that Zheng did not demonstrate 
a change in country conditions.
3
   The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Zheng‟s motion to reopen.  Accordingly, we will deny Zheng‟s petition for review.     
 
                                              
3
 We reject Zheng‟s argument that the BIA misunderstood or mischaracterized the 
basis for Zheng‟s motion to reopen.    
